Multi-attribute negotiation has been extensively studied from a game-theoretic viewpoint. In negotiation settings, utility functions are used to express agent preferences. Normal and extensive form games, however, have the drawback of requiring an explicit representation of utility functions, listing the utility values for all combinations of strategies. Therefore, several logical preference languages have been proposed, to specify multi-attribute utility functions in a compact way. Among these approaches, there are also Boolean games. In this paper, we introduce Boolean description logic games, which are a combination of Boolean games with ontological background knowledge, formulated using expressive description logics. In this way, it is possible to enhance the expressiveness of preference representation, maintaining the advantages of the game-theoretic approach. We include and discuss several generalizations, showing their practical usefulness within a service negotiation scenario. Furthermore, we also provide complexity results.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the recent decade, a huge amount of research activities has been centered around the problem of automated negotiation. This is especially due to the development of the World Wide Web, which has provided the means and the commercial necessity for the further development of computational negotiation and bargaining techniques [1] .
Another area with an impressive amount of recent research activities is the Semantic Web [2] , [3] , which aims at an extension of the current Web by standards and technologies that help machines to understand the information on the Web so that they can support richer discovery, data integration, navigation, and automation of tasks. The main ideas behind it are to add a machine-readable meaning to Web pages, to use ontologies for a precise definition of shared terms in the Web, to use knowledge representation technology for automated reasoning from the Web, and to apply cooperative agent technology for processing the information of the Web.
Only a marginal amount of research activities, however, focuses on the intersection of automated negotiation and the Semantic Web (see Section VI). This is surprising, since representation and reasoning technologies from the Semantic Web may be used to further enhance automated negotiation on the Web, e.g., by providing ontological background knowledge. Moreover, although one important ingredient of the Semantic Web is agent technology, the agents are still largely missing in Semantic Web research to date [4] . This paper is a first step in direction to filling this gap. Towards automated multi-attribute negotiation in the Semantic Web, we introduce Boolean description logic games. The main contributions of this paper are briefly as follows:
• We define n-agent Boolean description logic games, which are a combination of classical n-player Boolean games with description logics (DLs). They combine classical n-player Boolean games with ontological background knowledge; in addition, we also introduce strict agent requirements and overlapping agent control assignments. • We then generalize to n-agent Boolean description logic games where each agent has a set of weighted goals, which may be defined over free DL concepts. • We analyze the complexity of important decision problems for n-agent Boolean description logic games. In particular, we show that n-agent Boolean description logic games relative to the DL-Lite family as underlying DLs have the same complexity as standard n-player Boolean games. • We provide examples from a service negotiation scenario, which illustrate the introduced concepts related to Boolean description logic games, and which give evidence of the practical usefulness of our approach.
Intuitively, Boolean description logic games can be seen as a one-step negotiation process. Clearly, the scenario presented here is also closely related to service matchmaking and resource retrieval, since the service provider and consumer can both be considered as agents having certain service specifications and preferences, and the result of the negotiation process is then the service where the service specifications are matching optimally the service preferences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give some brief preliminaries. In Section III, we define Boolean description logic games. Section IV introduces Boolean description logic games with weighted generalized goals. Section V provides complexity results. In Section VI, we discuss related work. Section VII summarizes the main results and gives an outlook on future research. The proofs of all results in this paper are in the extended paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall the basic concepts of description logics (DLs) and Boolean games.
A. Description Logics
We now recall the description logics SHIF(D) and SHOIN (D), which stand behind the web ontology languages OWL Lite and OWL DL [5] , respectively. Intuitively, description logics model a domain of interest in terms of concepts and roles, which represent classes of individuals and binary relations between classes of individuals, respectively. A description logic knowledge base encodes especially subset relationships between concepts, subset relationships between roles, the membership of individuals to concepts, and the membership of individual pairs to roles.
Syntax: We first describe the syntax of SHOIN (D). We assume a set of elementary datatypes and a set of data values. A datatype is either an elementary datatype or a set of data values (called datatype oneOf ). A datatype theory D = (∆ D , · D ) consists of a datatype domain ∆ D and a mapping · D that assigns to each elementary datatype a subset of ∆ D and to each data value an element of ∆ D . The mapping · D is extended to all datatypes by {v 1 , . . .} D = {v D 1 , . . .}. Let A, R A , R D , and I be pairwise disjoint (nonempty) denumerable sets of atomic concepts, abstract roles, datatype roles, and individuals, respectively. We denote by
Concepts are inductively defined as follows. Every φ ∈ A is a concept, and if o 1 , . . . , o n ∈ I, then {o 1 , . . . , o n } is a concept (called oneOf). If φ, φ 1 , and φ 2 are concepts and if R ∈ R A ∪ R − A , then also (φ 1 φ 2 ), (φ 1 φ 2 ), and ¬φ (called conjunction, disjunction, and negation, respectively), as well as ∃R.φ, ∀R.φ, nR, and nR (called exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. If D is a datatype and U ∈ R D , then ∃U.D, ∀U.D, nU , and nU are concepts (called datatype exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. We write ∃R and ∀R to abbreviate ∃R. and ∀R. , respectively. We write and ⊥ to abbreviate φ ¬φ and φ ¬φ, respectively, and we eliminate parentheses as usual.
An axiom has one of the following forms: (1) φ ψ (called concept inclusion axiom), where φ and ψ are concepts; ( membership axiom), where φ is a concept and a ∈ I; (5) R(a, b) (resp., U (a, v)) (called role membership axiom), where R ∈ R A (resp., U ∈ R D ) and a, b ∈ I (resp., a ∈ I and v is a data value); and (6) a = b (resp., a = b) (equality (resp., inequality) axiom), where a, b ∈ I. A knowledge base L is a finite set of axioms. For decidability, number restrictions in L are restricted to simple abstract roles [6] . Since knowledge bases encode ontologies, we also use ontology to denote a knowledge base.
The syntax of SHIF(D) is as the above syntax of SHOIN (D), but without the oneOf constructor and with the atleast and atmost constructors limited to 0 and 1.
Example 1 (travel ontology): We refer to a DL knowledge base L encoding a travel ontology (adapted from http://protege.cim3.net/file/pub/ontologies/travel/) given by the axioms in Fig. 1 . For example, there are some axioms encoding that bed and breakfast (BB) accommodations and hotels are different accommodations, and that a budget accommodation is an accommodation that has one or two stars as a rating.
Semantics: An interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) relative to a datatype theory D = (∆ D , · D ) consists of a nonempty (abstract) domain ∆ I disjoint from ∆ D , and a mapping · I that assigns to each atomic concept φ ∈ A a subset of ∆ I , to each individual o ∈ I an element of ∆ I , to each abstract role R ∈ R A a subset of ∆ I × ∆ I , and to each datatype role U ∈ R D a subset of ∆ I × ∆ D . We extend · I to all concepts and roles, and we define the satisfaction of an axiom F in an interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ), denoted I |= F , as usual [5] . We say I satisfies the axiom F , or I is a model of F , iff I |= F . We say I satisfies a knowledge base L, or I is a model of L, denoted I |= L, iff I |= F for all F ∈ L. We say L is satisfiable (resp., unsatisfiable) iff L has a (resp., no) model. An axiom F is a logical consequence of L, denoted L |= F , iff each model of L satisfies F . Example 2 (travel ontology cont'd): It is not difficult to verify that the description logic knowledge base L of Example 1 is satisfiable, and that the two concept inclusion axioms Capital
UrbanArea and Capital ¬RuralArea are logical consequences of L. Informally, L implies that capitals are urban and not rural areas.
B. Boolean Games
We now recall n-player Boolean games [7] , which are a generalization of 2-player Boolean games [8] , [9] . Such games are essentially normal form games where propositional logic is used for compactly specifying multi-attribute utility functions. We first give some preparative definitions, and then recall n-player Boolean games, including their ingredients, strategy profiles, and notions of optimality.
We assume a finite set of propositional variables V = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k }. We denote by L V the set of all propositional formulas (denoted by Greek letters ψ, φ, . . .) built inductively from V via the Boolean operators ¬, ∧, and ∨.
An n-player Boolean game G = (N, V, π, Φ) consists of (1) a set of n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n 2, (2) a finite set of propositional variables V , (3) a control assignment π : N → 2 V , which associates with each player i ∈ N a set of variables π(i) ⊆ V , which she controls, such that {π(i) | i ∈ N } partitions V , (4) a goal assignment Φ : N → L V , which associates with every player i ∈ N a propositional formula Φ(i) ∈ L V , denoted the goal of i. Example 3 (Boolean game): A two-player Boolean game G = (N, V, π, Φ) is given by: (1) the set of two players N = {1, 2}, (2) the set of propositional variables V = {a, b, c}, (3) the control assignment π(1) = {a, c} and π(2) = {b}, (4) the goal assignment Φ(1) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (¬c ∧ ¬b) and Φ(2) = (c ∧ ¬b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b). Informally, we have two players 1 and 2, and three propositional variables a, b, and c. Player 1 (resp., 2) controls the variables a and c (resp., the variable b) and has the goal expressed by the propositional formula Φ(1) (resp., Φ(2)).
A strategy for player i ∈ N is any truth assignment s i to the variables in π(i). A strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) consists of one strategy s i for every i ∈ N . The utility to player i ∈ N under s, denoted u i (s), is 1, if s satisfies i's goal Φ(i), and 0, otherwise.
Towards optimal behavior of the players in an n-player Boolean game, we are especially interested in strategy profiles s, called Nash equilibria, where no agent has the incentive to deviate from its part, once the other agents play their parts. More formally, a strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , is a Nash equilibrium iff u i (s s i ) u i (s) for every strategy s i of player i and for every player i ∈ N , where s s i is the strategy profile obtained from s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) by replacing s i by s i .
Another important notion of optimality is Paretooptimality. Informally, a strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other strategy profile that makes one player better off and no player worse off in the utility. More formally, a strategy profile s is Pareto-optimal iff there exists no strategy profile s such that
Example 4 (Boolean game cont'd): Consider again the two-player Boolean game G = (N, V, π, Φ) of Example 3. Player 1 has all truth assignments to the variables a and c (that is, a, c → true, true, a, c → true, false, a, c → false, true, and a, c → false, false, denoted a c, a c, a c, and a c, respectively) as strategies, while player 2 has all truth assignments to b as strategies (that is, b → true and b → false, denoted b and b, respectively). Any combination of the strategies of two players is a strategy profile. For example, (a c, b) is a strategy profile combining the strategy a c of player 1 and the strategy b of player 2.
The normal form of this two-player Boolean game, using the above strategy profiles s = (s 1 , s 2 ), which combine all strategies s 1 and s 2 of the players 1 and 2, respectively, is depicted in Fig. 2 : for every strategy profile s = (s 1 , s 2 ), the matrix has one entry, which shows the pair of utilities (u 1 (s), u 2 (s)) under s to the two players. The utility u i (s) is equal to 1, when Φ(i) is satisfied in s, and 0, otherwise.
It is then easy to verify that the strategy profile (a c, b) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of this two-player Boolean game G, which is also Pareto-optimal, while (a c, b) is also a (pure) Nash equilibrium of G, but not Pareto-optimal.
III. BOOLEAN DESCRIPTION LOGIC GAMES
In this section, we present our approach to Boolean description logic games, which combine classical n-player Boolean games with ontologies. The main differences to classical n-player Boolean games are as follows:
• Rather than unrelated propositional variables, agents now control atomic DL concepts, which may (abbreviate complex DL concepts and) be related via a DL knowledge base. In fact, the assumption that the controlled variables are unrelated in classical n-player Boolean games is quite unrealistic; often the variables (attributes) are related through some background knowledge, e.g., the different types of accommodation or destinations (see Fig. 1 ). • Rather than having only preferences, agents may now also have strict goals, which have to be necessarily true in an admissible agreement. This reflects the fact that agents accept no agreement where some strict conditions are not true; such strict conditions are very common in many applications in practice, e.g., an agent may necessarily want an accommodation in a BB located in a rural area. • Rather than defining a partition, the control assignment may now be overlapping. In fact, such overlapping control assignments are also more realistic (especially also in the presence of a DL knowledge base).
We first give some preparative definitions as follows. Here, we use a finite set of atomic concepts A instead of a set of propositional variables V in n-player Boolean games. We denote by L A the set of all concepts (denoted by Greek letters ψ, φ, . . .) built inductively from A via the Boolean operators ¬, , and . An interpretation I is a full conjunction of atomic concepts and negated atomic concepts from A. We say I satisfies a DL knowledge base L, denoted
We say φ is satisfiable under L iff there exists an interpretation I such that I |= L φ. We now define n-agent Boolean description logic games.
Definition 1 (n-agent Boolean description logic games): An n-agent Boolean description logic game (or n-agent Boolean dl-game) G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) consists of 1) a DL knowledge base L, 2) a finite set of n agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n 2, 3) a finite set of atomic concepts A, 4) a control assignment π : N → 2 A , which associates with every agent i ∈ N a set of atomic concepts π(i) ⊆ A, which she controls, 5) a strict goal assignment Σ : N → L A , which associates with every agent i ∈ N a concept Σ(i) ∈ L A that is satisfiable under L, denoted the strict goal of i, and 6) a goal assignment Φ : N → L A , which associates with every agent i ∈ N a concept Φ(i) ∈ L A that is satisfiable under L, denoted the goal of i.
As for the difference between strict and general goals, the agents necessarily want their strict goals to be satisfied, but they only would like their general goals to be satisfied.
Example 5 (travel negotiation): A two-agent Boolean dlgame G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ), where the traveler (agent 1) negotiates with the travel agency (agent 2) on the conditions of a vacation, is given as follows:
1) L is the travel ontology of Example 1, depicted in Fig. 1 . 2) N = {1, 2}, where agent 1 (resp., 2) is the traveler (resp., travel agent).
3)
A consists of the following (negotiation-relevant) atomic concepts (along with their definitions in L): 4) Agents 1 and 2 control the following concepts π(1) and π(2), respectively:
Informally, agent 1 decides whether the trip takes place to an urban, rural, or budget hotel destination, while 2's offers fix the budget, the type of accommodation (hotel or BB), and the destination to a national park or capital city. 5) Agents 1 and 2 have the following strict goals Σ(1) and Σ(2), respectively:
Informally, agent 1 necessarily wants a destination in an urban or a rural area, e.g., she does not like beach destinations, and she also wants an accommodation for her trip in a hotel or a bed and breakfast, so she is excluding, e.g., camping grounds. While agent 2 is trying to sell a destination in a national park or a capital city. 6) Agents 1 and 2 have the following goals Φ(1) and Φ(2), respectively,
Informally, agent 1 would like a destination in a rural area and an accommodation in a bed and breakfast, or a budget hotel accommodation in a capital city. Whereas agent 2 would like to sell a destination in an urban area and an accommodation in a bed and breakfast, or a budget hotel destination in a national park. We next define the notions of strategies, strategy profiles, and utility functions. In classical n-agent Boolean games, a strategy for agent i is a truth assignment s i to all the variables she controls, and the utility functions of the agents depend on their goals built from the variables. In our setting, in contrast, atomic concepts are related to each other through a DL knowledge base L, and each agent may have some strict requirements, and so some truth assignments to the atomic concepts may be infeasible because of L and the strict requirements. We thus exclude such infeasible strategies. In addition, some combinations I of feasible strategies may result in an infeasible strategy profile due to L and the fact that the control assignment may be overlapping. We model this, exploiting the utility structure: if I is infeasible due to L or the overlapping control assignment, then the utility to all agents is −1; in contrast, if I is feasible, then the utility to agent i under I is equal to 1, if its goal Φ(i) is satisfied, and 0, otherwise. Therefore, when the agreement I is unsatisfiable, then the utilities are always negative, that is, always less than the utilities when the agreement I is satisfiable. Hence, the unsatisfiable agreement will never be chosen by the agents. Definition 2 (strategies, strategy profiles, utilities): Let G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) be an n-agent Boolean dl-game. Then, a strategy for agent i ∈ N is an interpretation I i for the concepts in π(i) that satisfies both (i) L and (ii) Σ(i) under L. A strategy profile I = (I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n ) consists of one strategy I i for every agent i ∈ N . We say I = (I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n ) is consistent iff (i) there exists an interpretation J for A such that I i is the restriction of J to π(i), for every agent i ∈ N , and (ii) I satisfies L. The utility to agent i ∈ N under I, denoted u i (I), is defined by:
if I is consistent, I |=L Σ(i), and I |=L Φ(i); 0
if I is consistent, I |=L Σ(i), and I |=L Φ(i).
We illustrate the above concepts in the following example. Example 6 (travel negotiation cont'd):
The sets of all strategies I 1 and I 2 of agents 1 and 2, respectively, in the travel negotiation example are given as follows:
The set of all strategy profiles is I 1 × I 2 . The utility pairs (u 1 (I), u 2 (I)) for each strategy profile I = (I 1 , I 2 ) are shown in Fig. 3 , which actually depicts the normal form of the two-agent Boolean dl-game G. Note that all inconsistent strategy profiles (due to the DL knowledge base L) are associated with two negative utilities. We next define (pure) Nash equilibria of n-agent Boolean dl-games. Informally, as in the classical case, they are strategy profiles where no agent has the incentive to deviate from its part once the other agents stick to their parts.
Definition 3 (pure Nash equilibria): Let G = (L, N, A, π, Φ) be an n-agent Boolean dl-game with N = {1, . . . , n}. Then, a strategy profile I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of G iff u i (I I i ) u i (I) for every strategy I i of agent i and for every agent i ∈ N , where I I i is the strategy profile obtained from I by replacing I i by I i .
Another concept of optimality for strategy profiles, which serves for choosing the best among a set of Nash equilibria, is the notion of Pareto-optimality. Informally, a strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other strategy profile that makes one agent better off and no agent worse off in the utility. Note that, as in the classical case, Nash equilibria are not necessarily Pareto-optimal.
Definition 4 (Pareto-optimal strategy profiles): Let G = (L, N, A, π, Φ) be an n-agent Boolean dl-game with N = {1, . . . , n}. Then, a strategy profile I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) is Pareto-optimal iff there exists no strategy profile I such that (i) u i (I ) > u i (I) for some agent i ∈ N and (ii) u i (I ) u i (I) for every agent i ∈ N .
Example 7 (travel negotiation cont'd):
The set of all (pure) Nash equilibria of the two-agent Boolean dl-game G of Example 5 are given by the bold entries in Fig. 3 . It is not difficult to verify that all, except for the (0, 0) ones, are also Pareto-optimal.
IV. WEIGHTED GENERALIZED GOALS
In this section, we further extend Boolean dl-games by weighted and generalized goals:
• Instead of one single goal that each agent wants to satisfy, we now assume a set of goals for each agent, where each goal of an agent is associated with a weight. This considers the fact that goals can have different importance, so the best agreement is not necessarily the agreement satisfying the greatest number of goals for each agent. We thus define Boolean dl-games with weighted goals, that is, multi-valued preferences. Note that agent utilities are normalized to 1 to make them comparable. • We also do not assume that agent goals are constructed from the controlled atomic concepts (that is, the agent goals may be defined over free DL concepts). Definition 5 (Boolean dl-games with weighted goals): An n-agent Boolean dl-game with weighted goals G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) consists of 1) a DL knowledge base L, 2) a finite set of n agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n 2, 3) a finite set of atomic concepts A, 4) a control assignment π : N → 2 A , which associates with every agent i ∈ N a set of atomic concepts π(i) ⊆ A, which she controls, 5) a strict goal assignment Σ : N → L A , which associates with every agent i ∈ N a concept Σ(i) ∈ L A that is satisfiable under L, denoted the strict goal of i, and 6) a weighted goal assignment Φ, which associates with every agent i ∈ N a mapping Φ i from a finite set of concepts L i that are satisfiable under L (denoted the weighted goals of i) to + such that φ∈Li Φ i (φ) = 1.
Observe that the Boolean dl-games of Section III are special cases of Boolean dl-games with weighted goals.
Example 8 (travel negotiation cont'd): A two-agent Boolean dl-game with weighted goals G = (L , N , A , π , Σ , Φ ) for the travel negotiation example is obtained from the two-agent Boolean dl-game G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) of Example 5 as follows:
3) A consists of the atomic concepts in A and the following new ones:
TP ≡ ∃hasActivity.ThemePark; SS ≡ ∃hasActivity.Sightseeing; HK ≡ ∃hasActivity.Hiking. 4) Agents 1 and 2 control the following concepts π(1) and π(2), respectively: π(1) = {U, R, BHD, SS, HK}; π(2) = {BA, H, BB, NP, C, TP}.
More concretely, compared to Example 5, the agents now control more variables, namely, Sightseeing and Hiking for agent 1, and ThemePark for agent 2. 5) Agents 1 and 2 have the following strict goals Σ(1) and Σ(2), respectively:
More specifically, compared to Example 5, the agents 1 and 2 now also require BudgetHotelDestination and 1 hasActivity, respectively, in the strict goals. Informally, agent 1 also wants a budget hotel destination, while agent 2 is trying to sell a destination which includes at least one activity. Informally, agent 1 would like either (a) a family destination, or (b) a relax destination, or (c) a capital or rural destination with sports activities in a theme park, the latter with a slightly higher weight. Whereas agent 2 would like to sell either (a) a destination in a rural area with sightseeing, or (b) a family destination with theme park, or (c) a relax destination with hiking, the latter with slightly higher weight. The notions of strategies and strategy profiles along with the consistency of strategy profiles are defined in the same way as for Boolean dl-games with binary goals. The following definition extends the utility to weighted goals.
Definition 6 (utilities with weighted goals): Let G = (L, N, A, π, Φ, Σ) be an n-agent Boolean dl-game with weighted goals. Then, the utility to agent i ∈ N under I, denoted u i (I), is defined as follows:
if I is consistent, I |= L, and I |=L Σ(i).
Example 9 (travel negotiation cont'd):
The normal form representation of the two-agent Boolean dl-game with weighted goals G of Example 8 is depicted in Fig. 4 . Its only (pure) Nash equilibria are given by the bold entries in Fig. 4 . Observe that the Nash equilibrium with utility pair (1, 1) is also Pareto-optimal.
V. COMPLEXITY
In this section, we analyze the complexity of important decision problems for n-player Boolean dl-games with weighted goals. While much of the research on DLs of the last decade was centered around decidability issues, there is a current trend towards highly scalable techniques, which are especially necessary for applications in the Web and the Semantic Web. For this reason, we consider the DL-Lite family of tractable DLs [10] here. They are a restricted class of classical DLs for which the main reasoning tasks in DLs can be done in deterministic polynomial time in the size of the knowledge base and some of these tasks even in LogSpace in the size of the ABox in the data complexity. The DL-Lite DLs are the most common tractable DLs in the Semantic Web context. They are especially directed towards data-intensive applications.
It turns out that relative to the DL-Lite family of tractable DLs, n-player Boolean dl-games with weighted goals have the same complexity as standard n-player Boolean games.
The following result shows that deciding whether an interpretation satisfies a knowledge base in DL-Lite is tractable. Recall here that an interpretation is a full conjunction of atomic concepts and negated atomic concepts from A.
Theorem 1: Given a knowledge base L in DL-Lite and an interpretation I, deciding whether I |= L holds can be done in polynomial time.
The next result shows that deciding whether a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium of a Boolean dl-game with weighted goals is co-NP-complete. Here, the upper bound follows from the fact that guessing and verifying a better strategy profile can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time, since deciding I |= L can be done in polynomial time, by Theorem 1, and the lower bound follows from the NPhardness of propositional satisfiability.
Theorem 2: Given an n-agent Boolean dl-game G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) with weighted goals, where L is in DL-Lite, and a strategy profile I, deciding whether I is a pure Nash equilibrium of G is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds even when n = 2, L = ∅, and Σ(i) = and |Φ(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Similarly, deciding whether a strategy profile is a Paretooptimal pure Nash equilibrium is also complete for co-NP.
Theorem 3: Given an n-agent Boolean dl-game G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) with weighted goals and L in DL-Lite, and a strategy profile I, deciding whether I is a Pareto-optimal pure Nash equilibrium of G is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds even when n = 2, L = ∅, and Σ(i) = and |Φ(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ N .
The following result shows that deciding whether an nagent Boolean dl-game has a pure Nash equilibrium is complete for Σ p 2 . Here, the upper bound follows from the observation that guessing a pure Nash equilibrium and verifying it can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time with an oracle for NP, since deciding I |= L can be done in polynomial time, by Theorem 1. The lower bound follows from the Σ p 2 -hardness of deciding whether a standard 2player Boolean game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4: Given an n-agent Boolean dl-game G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) with weighted goals, where L is in DL-Lite, deciding whether G has a pure Nash equilibrium is Σ p 2 -complete. Hardness holds even when n = 2, L = ∅, and Σ(i) = and |Φ(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ N .
As an immediate consequence, deciding the existence of Pareto-optimal pure Nash equilibria is also Σ p 2 -complete. Corollary 5: Given an n-agent Boolean dl-game G = (L, N, A, π, Σ, Φ) with weighted goals, where L is in DL-Lite, deciding whether G has a Pareto-optimal pure Nash equilibrium is Σ p 2 -complete. Hardness holds even when n = 2, L = ∅, and Σ(i) = and |Φ(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ N .
For more expressive DLs, deciding I |= L has in general a higher complexity, and consequently also the above decision problems for n-agent Boolean dl-games have a higher complexity. For example, for the DLs behind OWL Lite and OWL DL, deciding I |= L is in EXP and NEXP, respectively. Thus, verifying pure and Pareto-optimal pure Nash equilibria is in EXP and NEXP, respectively, while deciding their existence is in EXP and NP NEXP = P NEXP , respectively.
VI. RELATED WORK
A large number of negotiation mechanisms have been proposed and studied in the literature. It is possible to distinguish, among others, game-theoretic ones [11] , [12] , heuristic-based approaches [13] , [14] and logic-based approaches. In the following, we give a brief overview of logic-based approaches to automated negotiation, comparing our approach to existing ones and highlighting relevant differences. Several recent logic-based approaches to negotiation are based on propositional logic. Bouveret et al. [15] use weighted propositional formulas (WPFs) to express agent preferences in the allocation of indivisible goods, but no common knowledge (as our ontology) is present. The use of an ontology allows, e.g., to discover inconsistencies between strategies, as well as attributes, or to find out if an agent preference is implied by a combination of strategies (an interpretation) which is fundamental to model a multi-attribute negotiation. Chevaleyre et al. [16] classify utility functions expressed through WPFs according to the properties of the utility function (sub/super-additive, monotone, etc.). We used the most expressive functions according to that classification, namely, weights over unrestricted formulas. Zhang and Zhang [17] adopt a kind of propositional knowledge base arbitration to choose a fair negotiation outcome. However, common knowledge is considered as just more entrenched preferences, that could even be dropped in some deals. Instead, the logical constraints in our ontology must always be enforced in the negotiation outcomes. Wooldridge and Parsons [18] define an agreement as a model for a set of formulas from both agents. However, Wooldridge and Parsons [18] study only multiple-rounds protocols and the approach leaves the burden to reach an agreement to the agents themselves, although they can follow a protocol. The approach does not take preferences into account, so that it is not possible to compute utility values and check if the reached agreement is Pareto-optimal or a Nash equilibrium. For what concerns approaches using more expressive ontology languages, namely, DLs, there is the work by Ragone et al. [19] , which although uses a rather inexpressive DL, ALEH(D), proposes a semantic-based alternating-offers protocol exploiting non-standard inference services, as concept contraction, and utility theory to find the most suitable agreements. Furthermore, differently from our approach, no game-theoretic analysis is provided about Nash equilibria. Another work exploits DLs in negotiation scenarios [20] , where the more expressive SHOIN (D) is used to model the logic-based negotiation protocol; a scenario with fully incomplete information is studied, where agents do not know anything about the opponent (neither preferences nor utilities). Furthermore, also this framework lacks a game-theoretic analysis about Nash equilibria.
VII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have introduced Boolean description logic games, which combine classical Boolean games with expressive DLs. As further generalizations of classical Boolean games, they also include strict agent requirements, overlapping agent control assignments, and weighted goals, which may be defined over free DL concepts. We have also analyzed the complexity of Boolean description logic games for the DL-Lite family of DLs. Furthermore, formulations of a travel service negotiation scenario have given evidence of the practical usefulness of our approach.
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